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Dov M. Gabbay Fibring Argumentation Frames
Abstract. This paper is part of a research program centered around argumentation
networks and oﬀering several research directions for argumentation networks, with a view
of using such networks for integrating logics and network reasoning.
In Section 1 we introduce our program manifesto. In Section 2 we motivate and show
how to substitute one argumentation network as a node in another argumentation network.
Substitution is a purely logical operation and doing it for networks, besides developing
their theory further, also helps us see how to bring logic and networks closer together.
Section 3 develops the formal properties of the new kind of network and Section 4
oﬀers general discussion and comparison with the literature.
Keywords: ﬁbring argumentation frames, joint attacks, disjunctive attacks, critical sets,
ﬂow argumentation networks.
1. Overview
1.1. Logic and networks — a manifesto
In the past half century various formal tools have been proposed for the study
of human behaviour in daily life. Such tools were developed in computer
science, communication, artiﬁcial intelligence, language study, law, analytic
philosophy, psychology and cognition, among others. Main among these
tools are the formal logical systems (classical logic, non-monotonic logics,
modal and temporal logics, etc., etc.) and various network models such as
argumentation networks, neural networks, Bayesian networks, inheritance
networks, and more. There is no unifying view for all these tools, and in
fact they are developed by completely diﬀerent international communities
with very little common ground and communication and yet (see below) all of
these features of human behaviour (logics and networks) do reside coherently
in the individual human mind and enable him to function intelligently in his
day-to-day activity.
There is some realisation among a few of these diverse communities that
communication between them needs to take place and unifying principles are
indeed sought. Unfortunately not much is known and certainly no coherent
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and successful unifying view exists. The mission of this manifesto to provide
such a view.
To explain what we have in mind, we start with a simple example.
Example 1.1 (The Messy Room). Mother goes into her teenage daughter’s
bedroom. Her instant impression is that it is a big mess. There is stuﬀ
scattered everywhere.
Mother’s impression is that it is not characteristic of the girl to be
like this.
What has happened?
Conjecture: The girl has boyfriend problems.
Further Analysis: Mother noticed a collapsed shelf. Did the girl smash it?
Upon further observation, mother notices that the pattern of chaos shows
that a shelf has collapsed because of excessive weight and scattered every-
thing around, giving the impression of a big mess. But, actually, it is not a
mess, it does make some (gravitational) sense.
There are several modes of reasoning:
1. Neural nets type of reasoning.
She recognises the mess instantly, like we recognise a face.
2. Nonmonotonic deduction.
Mother reasons from context and her knowledge of her daughter that the
girl is not disorganised like this. She asks ‘what happened?’.
3. Abduction/conjecture.
She oﬀers a reasonable explanation that the girl has boyfriend problems.
This is common to that age.
4. She then applies a database AI deduction and recognises that the mess
is due to gravity. This deduction is no longer a neural net impression. It
is a careful calculation.
4*. Item (4) could have been a neural net impression.
For example, a man who sees many shelf collapsing mess cases may
recognise the pattern like it were a face (in which case it would be a
neural net-like recognition).
2*. Item (2) could have been a Bayesian network.
Clearly all of these reasoning tools are working together in the mother’s
mind. Can we give a uniﬁed model? What does it look like in principle?
Furthermore, suppose both mother and father have seen the room. Fa-
ther may reach diﬀerent conclusions about the girl and demand some action.
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A dialogue, argumentation and negotiation between the parents will follow
with a view to reaching a merged knowledge base and an agreed course
of action.
The value of a uniﬁed model goes beyond just a unifying formal theory.
Even if we take the view that each of these components model a diﬀerent
aspect of the human (constructed as a model for the purpose of installing
on a computer or a robot) a uniﬁed theory can help extend their range of
applicability and help integrate them better. But we hope for more. We
hope that such a model built up carefully might give us a better insight on
how people actually reason. Something of great interest to the philosopher,
psychologist, linguist and cognitive scientist. A uniﬁed theory would be a
better, sharper tool in their hands.
First let us list what systems (and communities studying them) are involved.
We have:
A. Networks:
neural nets, argumentation nets, Bayesian nets, fuzzy nets, biological
predator-prey networks, transportation networks, ﬂow networks, inher-
itance nets, mathematical graphs, Kripke models, Description logics,
Electrical networks, legal jurisdiction nets, social networks, input-output
nets, and more.
B. Logics:
classical logic, modal and temporal logics, nonmonotonic logics, logic
programming, Labelled deductive systems, and more.
C. Mechanisms:
abduction, belief revision and merging, consistency/paraconsistency, me-
ta-level vs. object level, and more.
D. Metalevel principles:
ﬁbring and combining systems, communication between systems, and
more.
A quick analysis of this task immediately shows how huge the problem is.
There is a lot of work to be done just in providing a unifying view between
networks, let alone making a connection with logics. The rich variety of net-
works and the diﬀerent research communities supporting them have diﬀerent
underlying assumptions, diﬀerent ranges of applicability1 and diﬀerent kinds
of mathematics involved. How do we bring them together?
1It is regrettable that the communities involved have not studied the range of appli-
cability of their tools. To compare with, e.g. pain killers oﬀered by the pharmaceutical
community, it is always made clear in what circumstances one can or cannot use them.
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A simple working procedure seems successful. We ﬁrst identify charac-
teristic movements in each kind of network and then see whether we can
generalise the other networks with similar features. Iterating this process
will hopefully lead us to a general notion of network which can specialise
to the various existing networks. Once we have that, we can try and see
how this general network notion can unify with ordinary logics and other
mechanisms.
This procedure has the advantage of extending and generalising each net-
work we work with in a meaningful way. Thus each research area will beneﬁt
incrementally. Our understanding of characteristic movement existing in one
source network (e.g. loops, feedback, aggregation) will be enhanced by de-
veloping its counterpart manifestations in other target networks, with the
added beneﬁt of meaningful generalisations in the target networks.
The task is not only a scientiﬁc problem but also a social problem.
The diverse communities of research in particular networks (e.g. Bayesian
community, neural community, argumentation community, logic, etc.) are
all immersed in their own areas and are not likely to respond to unifying
theories. Our scientiﬁc strategy must be such that it is compatible with the
social situation and is likely to generate enthusiasm and response from a
signiﬁcant group of researchers. This is why we proceed from the ground up
as described above. Furthermore, it is fortunate that one type of network,
the argumentation network is open to further generalisation and research in
a natural and large scale way. Features existing in other networks can be
naturally (though not easily) brought into argumentation networks and these
features do have a natural meaning there. Furthermore the argumentation
community itself is open-minded and is in fact desiring to expand their
ﬁeld. Many of their individual members have background in logic and will
therefore easily see and respond to a general unifying theory with logic.
So our strategy is as follows.
1. Assume the current state of argumentation networks is S
2. Study other networks and identify features F1, F2, . . . existent in such
networks but not in S.
3. Extend the theory of S to new SF by incorporating and generalising all of
these features in a meaningful way. This is not simple. It is real research
which will be meaningful to the argumentation community. It will also
generate further generalizations to be exported to other networks.
4. Emerge with a generalised theory of network, say Snew ⊃ SF .
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5. Specialise Snew into other networks (e.g. network T ) to show that Snew
is general enough to unify big chunks of other networks. Get, for exam-
ple, Tnew. Chances are that Tnew will naturally and intuitively suggest
new features to be exported back to Snew to form S
1
new.
6. Generalise further to a uniﬁed theory with logic, call it SL.
7. Iterate the entire process to obtain S2new, T
2
new, S
2
L, . . . etc.
The following table lists features from other networks which can be im-
ported into argumentation networks.
Network Properties
Neural Feedback loops. Numerical weights on arcs. Real
number values, function approximation and learn-
ing emphasis.
Argumentation Nodes attacking nodes. Also sometimes support-
ing nodes. Loops is an issue with currently no
consensus. Logic programming way of thinking.
Nodes have logical content.
Bayesian Loops forbidden. Probabilistic approach.
Fuzzy Real number values and aggregation.
Biological Emphasis on loops and cycles through the loops.
Transportation Emphasis on paths and costs through paths.
Flow Emphasis on ﬂows and counterﬂows through paths
and nodes. Nodes are sources and Sinks.
Inheritance Emphasis on persistence and exceptions.
Graphs Mathematical theory. Counting of nodes, topo-
logy on connectivity. Pure mathematics point of
view.
Kripke models Propagation of values for evaluating formulas.
Description logic nets Similar to Kripke models but with diﬀerent em-
phasis. A fragment of predicate logic.
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Network Properties
Electrical networks Feedback loops. Equational approach. Net-
work generates equations to be solved.
Legal jurisdiction network Movability of data across jurisdiction.
Social networks Information propagation.
Input-output networks Nodes are logic processors.
To give the reader an idea of what SF might look like, we present a
diagram, Figure 1 of a generalised argumentation network and discuss its
features.
x : a y : b
e2 attack
u : d
e3 support
w : c = net = a′ → b′
e6 attack
indirect attack
because of e1
x1 : ♦k
e1 attack
e4 attack
e5 attack
Figure 1.
This is a complex diagram with the following generalisation:
1. It has both attack and support. Each argument has strength and there
is a rate of transmission. For example, node c (strength w) supports b
and the transmission rate is e3.
2. There is feedback from nodes to arcs u : d attacks the attack arc from
x : a to y : b.
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3. Arcs can attack or support other nodes or arcs. E.g. the arc e3 attacks
the arc e2 with strength e6.
4. There are indirect attacks, for example, of a on c because e supports b
and a attacks b.
5. There are loops, because c attacks x1 : ♦k which attacks x : a. If c is
weakened then the attack of x1 : ♦k may succeed and hence x : a fails.
So by attacking y : b, the node x : a opens itself to attack from x1 : ♦k
because it weakens w : c.
6. The entire system can be temporal if the strength and transmissions
are time dependent and the language of the arguments is temporal.
The node x1 : ♦k is temporal because x1 depends on time and ♦k says
there is the (future) possibility of argument k.
7. The net contains a subnet. c is the subnet a′ → b′. So we can also
ﬁbre nets within nets. This is also a problem of communication between
networks.
8. We need algorithms to propagate values within the net to get the emerg-
ing winning arguments. We need theory of aggregating values and han-
dling loops. We need to combine with temporal logic and change and we
need to know how to substitute one net inside the other.
Connection with logic
We will present logic data as networks. So the basic semantical notions will
be in the diagram: In Logic
formula, theory evaluated semantic model
In our generalised SL
master network evaluated slave network
This will include the logic case as a special case.
This is integrating with logic through the semantics. Proof theory can
also be developed as rules of syntactical manipulation of networks. The
framework for doing so is that of Labelled Deductive Systems [9].
To give the reader an idea of how we perceive logic as a network, consider
the formula p ∧ q → r. Its construction tree is Figure 2.
If we give values p = 1, q = 1, r = 0 to the atoms, then we can propagate
them down the tree. Our conclusion from this that a formula A is a network.
Now examine how we evaluate ♦q at a 3-node Kripke model, Figure 3.
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p r
p ∧ q → r
p ∧ q
q
Figure 2.
b c
a ♦q
q
Figure 3.
First we give joint values of 0 or 1 to pairs (x, q) (meaning x  q). Then
we jointly and inductively propagate the values down both networks.
So if α is a node in one network and E is a node in another network we
deﬁne the value α  E by recursive induction on the known values of the
rest of the pairs α′  E′. The ‘formulas’ correspond to one network and the
‘semantics’ is the other network. This way we can deﬁne the notion of one
network being true in another. M  N1.
Suppose we get that a semantics is a family of networks for evaluation.
If we have ∀M [M  N1 → M  N2] we can develop rules for transforming
N1 into N2. This is proof theory, LDS style.
Sample problems to be addressed
1. Aggregation of values. A node is attacked and supported by other nodes.
How do we aggregate? Joint attacks and disjunctive attacks. Nodes have
strength and arcs have transmission values.
2. General theory of attack absorption and its relation to belief change.
3. Temporal dynamics. The eﬀect of temporal change in each network.
We need to add a temporal language to the net as well as make all
parameters time dependent.
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4. Contents and ﬁbring of networks. Giving nodes a content, e.g. a theory,
or another network etc.
5. Feedback, e.g. nodes attacking connections.
6. Handling loops.
7. Procedures and theories for propagating values in networks and extract-
ing information from networks.
8. Metalevel, object level of networks, hierarchies.
9. Logic viewed as networks. A logical theory becomes a network.
10. Evaluating one network in another. One is the “theory” and the other
is the semantical “model”.
11. Proof theories for networks.
1.2. General view of argumentation networks
Having discussed our general manifesto in the previous subsection, let us
outline our view of argumentation networks in general and the place of ﬁbring
within this outline.
There are several ways of viewing and handling argumentation networks.
Main among them are the logic programming approach, the classical (ﬁrst-
order or higher-order) logic approach and the algebraic equational approach.
For the purpose of ﬁbring networks, the algebraic equational approach
is the most convenient.
Let us take as our starting point a classical model (S,R) of a binary
relation R on a non-empty set S. This is basically a directed graph. We
can read xRy as an arrow from x to y: x → y. If we view (S,R) as an
argumentation network then xRy means x attacks y.
(S,R) in general can be a basis for many types of networks. To give it
a more speciﬁc character, we need more annotations. Let us add the unary
predicates Q0, . . . , Qn. So Qi(x) is some property of x. Speciﬁc types of
networks will have some axioms relating the relation R to the predicates
Q0, . . . , Qn.
For example, for argumentation networks we have three predicates Q0,
Q1, Q2, corresponding to the three values {in, out, undecided} in a Caminada
labelling of arguments, and the relationships between them and R is governed
by a theory ∆ formalising the Caminada rules. See Deﬁnition 2.1 and see [5]
for a survey and further results.
In the more general case, we have a theory ∆(R,Q0, . . . , Qn) governing
the relationship between R and {Qi}. Any model of ∆ will be a properly
presented network of type ∆.
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The kind of questions one can ask in this context is the existence of
models of certain types, the existence and nature of models with maximal
or minimal Qi, and relationships between diﬀerent models.
The mathematical answers we obtain for the above questions will have
quality meaning in the context of the particular network we are studying.
For example for argumentation network, Q1 is the set of winning arguments
and so the members of Q1 give the ‘logical content’ of the network. For the
general case the above questions are purely mathematical.
We can therefore employ general formal logical techniques to get answers
to these questions.
For example, we can use second-order logic to ask for minimal models
for Q0. We write the wﬀ
θ(Q0 minimal) = ∆(R,Q0, . . . , Qn) ∧ ∀Q′0, . . . , Q′n(∆(R,Q′0, . . . , Q′n)→ Q0 ⊆ Q′0)
(S,R)  θ says that out of all possible models for Qi based on (S,R), our
model is the one with Q0, . . . , Qn where with Q0 minimal. To express this we
need to quantify over subsets. There are also methods for eliminating second-
order set quantiﬁers or for ﬁnding ﬁx point solutions for them. See [16].
These methods can also be proﬁtably employed here, see [18].
First-order logic is not suﬃcient to express the situation in Figure 1.
This is not because the ﬁgure contains several types of arrows (attack and
support). The diﬀerent types of arrows give rise to diﬀerent binary rela-
tions. Also the annotations of nodes and arrows is not a problem. We can
add parameters to the relations (so unary predicates become binary, binary
relations become ternary, etc.). The problem is arrows leading to arrows.
For example in Figure 1 we have an arrow emanating from c → b going
to the arrow emanating from d and attacking the arrow a→ b.
Writing this in full would yield a relation between 5 elements. This is too
complicated to be natural, since these arrows can be iterated to any higher
level. Thus a diﬀerent approach is required if we are seriously dealing with
complex networks as displayed in Figure 1.
The second approach is the equational algebraic approach. We regard
the predicates Qi(x) as algebraic values attached to the nodes x. Let x = ai
mean that Qi(x) holds. We now consider the axioms of ∆ as a vehicle using
R to formulate a system of equations on the algebra A = {ai}. Of course
suitable operations on A need to be deﬁned. These operations should arise
from ∆ and respect the declarative content of ∆. To see how this is done for
the case of argumentation networks see the discussion in Section 2.2. It is
not known what suﬃcient conditions we can put on a general network of type
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x1
xn
... b
Figure 4.
∆ to ensure that some algebraic equations can be extracted. This approach
is better for networks with many levels of arrows attacking arrows. This is
because the ‘higher order’ logic part gets processed into the equations and
we just end up with complex equations on the nodes. So from this point of
view the network is just an instrument for formulating equations.
The third approach is the logic programming approach. In fact in Dung’s
original paper [7], the words ‘logic programming’ are in the title. Consider
the network in Figure 4. The nodes x1, . . . , xn are all the nodes attacking b.
The Horn clause corresponding to it is
b if
∧
i
¬xi
where ¬ is negation as failure.
Given a network (S,R), we translate it into a set of Horn clauses by
taking he clauses
y if
∧
{x|xRy}
¬x
for all y ∈ S.
This translation, originally presented in [15] and further studied in [21]
gives a logic program with two special properties.
1. Each literal is the head of at most one clause.
2. All literals in a body of clauses are negated.
Given a logic program with properties (1) and (2) we can regain the corre-
sponding argumentation network by deﬁning
xRy iﬀ (deﬁnition) x appears in the body of the clause with head y.
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The general question of how to ﬁnd a corresponding argumentation net-
work for any general logic program, for example
y if a ∧ ¬b
y if c ∧ ¬d
(which does not satisfy (1) and (2) above), is studied in [21]. We use the
notion of a critical subset of an argumentation network introduced in Deﬁ-
nition 3.3.
Given a general logic program, we can represent it as a classical model of
the form (S,R±1 , . . . , R
±
k ). The elements of S are the literals of the program.
The relation xR+i y, xR
−
i y mean that the literal x appears positiely (resp.
negated) in the ith clause with head y.
So we have
clause i with head y: y if
∧
xR
+
i
y
x ∧∧
zR
−
i
y
z
1.3. Overview of our approach to ﬁbring
Given a network (S,R) with a node x ∈ S, we want to view it as a variable
for which we can substitute values. This question is a logical question and
can be asked of any system of any sort provided it allows for atomic elements.
The notion of ﬁbring of networks arises when we substitute for x another
network, see Figure 5. There are two options here
• General ﬁbring: we substitute any other network in any network, e.g.
substitute a neural network for a node x in argumentation network.
• Self ﬁbring: substitute networks of the same type. So in our case sub-
stitute an argumentation netwrok for a node in another argumentation
network.
We are faced with two immediate problems
• Give meaning to the substitution
• Generalise the notion of the network so that it is closed under substitu-
tion.
We discuss the meaning of the substitution and its properties in Sections
2.1 and 2.2. In section 2.3 we generalise the notion of argumentation network
so it is closed under substitution and we study its properties. We call these
networks higher-level networks.
Fibring Argumentation Frames 243
These are networks with conjunctive and disjunctive attacks. The results
in section 2 give rise to methodological considerations and these are studied
in Section 3. Our aim in Section 3 is to show the existence of labellings on
our new networks. We do this by reducing the new networks to ordinary
networks.
Section 4 compares our results with the literature and discusses further
research possibilities.
2. Fibring argumentation networks
2.1. The ﬁbring problem
On comparing general logics with networks, we ﬁnd that certain logical op-
erations, which are basic and widespread in logic, do not occur in networks.
One such operation is substitution. Given a logical formula A(q1, . . . , qk)
built up from the atoms q1, . . . , qk we can take q1 and substitute for it an-
other formula B(pj, qi) to obtain A(B(pj , qi), q2, . . . , qk). The analogous op-
eration in networks of any kind is to take a node q1 in a network N and
substitute for the node another network N′. This kind of operation is not
naturally done in networks. If we want to integrate logics with networks, it
might be helpful if we try to make sense of this operation for the cases of the
various networks available such as neural nets, Bayesian nets, argumentation
nets, etc.
Figure 5 shows the basic situation.
y
c
d
N
b
a q
N′
x
Figure 5.
We substitute N′ for the node q in the network N, to obtain N(q/BN ′).
The node q is connected to the nodes c and d in N and nodes a and b are
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connected to it. The exact nature of the connection is not relevant and it
depends on the nature of the network. In N′ we also have internal nodes
such as x and y and there is a connection from x to y. These nodes now
become nodes in the new network N(q/N′).
Our problem here is to make reasonable sense of this situation. We need
to address the following questions:
Question 1
How do we understand connections from a, b into N′? Do they connect in
any way to the internal nodes x and/or y?
Question 2
How do we understand connections emanating from N′ to other points in
N? Do they emanate from some nodes in N′?
Question 3
What do we do with nodes occurring in both N and N′?
These connections were originally going to and from q of N, but now we
have substituted N′ for q, and so we need to answer question 1, 2, and 3.
We also have to decide what to do with q itself. Do we leave it in N or is it
out being replaced by N′?
Question 4
Some networks have several options internally for what can happen to q.
Do we treat the substitution of N′ diﬀerently by case analysis depending on
what happens to q? (This is how we do it in Bayesian nets.)
We have already analysed this situation for the case of Bayesian nets
and for the case of neural nets. We found natural solutions to the above
questions but the solutions vary from network to network. The solution is
completely diﬀerent for neutral nets from the case of Bayesian nets. See [6]
for a summary.
Question 5
How do we view N′?. N′ is a network. In the case of Figure 4, N′ is a two
point network x → y. The question we ask is do we ‘process’ network N′
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ﬁrst (option 1) and then substitute the result, or do we substitute N′, as is
(option 2), ﬁrst and then process the result. In the case of N′, processing
means taking an extension, so in this case there is only the ground extension,
with x = in, and y = out. So if we process N′ ﬁrst, we ignore y since it is
out and substitute only x. Otherwise, we substitute N′ in its entirety. If N′
is the net of Figure 9 then we substitute the set {a, c} and we still have to
address questions 1–4.
If we choose option 1 and process N′ ﬁrst we must also address the case
where N′ has more than one extension, see for example Figure 17. Do we
do case analysis and diﬀerent substitutions in each case?
We shall address question 5 in the ﬁrst half of Section 2.3.
We now try to ﬁgure out a solution for argumentation nets and see what
we can get.
2.2. A fresh look at argumentation networks
We quickly recall some basic deﬁnitions in order to present a new point of
view on argumentation networks.
Definition 2.1.
1. An argumentation network has the form P = (S,R) where S = ∅ is the
set of arguments and R ⊆ S2 is the attack relation.
2. A Caminada labelling on P is comprised of three subsets of S,Q0, Q1, Q2
⊆ S satisfying the following axioms ∆:
(a) ∀x[Q0(x) ∨Q1(x) ∨Q2(x)]
(b) ∼ ∃x[Qi(x) ∧Qj(x)] for i = j, i, j = 0, 1, 2.
Q0 is the set of out arguments.
Q1 is the set of in arguments
Q2 is the set of undecided arguments.
(c) ∀y[∀x(xRy → Q0(x))→ Q1(y)]
(d) ∀y[∃x(xRy ∧Q1(x))→ Q0(y)]
(e) ∀y[(∀x(xRy → (Q0(x) ∨Q2(x))) ∧ ∃x(xRy ∧Q2(x))→ Q2(y)]
3. A network may have more than one Caminada labelling to its nodes,
which satisﬁes ∆, see Figure 17. Each such option is called an Extension.
4. Q1(x) says that x is labelled in (or x = in), Q0(x) says x is labelled out
(or x = out) and Q2(x) says that x is undecided (or x =?).
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The basic idea of the Caminada labelling can be expressed in the follow-
ing general terms. Assume xi are nodes, which we call units. (Since these
nodes might end up, after substitution, as networks, we prefer to call them
units.) These units execute among other things, an attack in the direction
of the unit y.
The labelling must satisfy the following conditions:
We use the same numbering as in Deﬁnition 2.1, namely: items 2c, 2d
and 2e of Deﬁnition 2.1.
For the unit y to be in, all attacking units x in the direction of y must
be out as far as the direction of y is concerned.
For the unit y to be out it is suﬃcient that one of its attacking units x
is in as far as the direction of y is concerned.
2.1.2e For a node to be undecided we must have that all the attackers in
its direction are out or undecided with at least one of them being
undecided.
Argumentation networks (called Argumentation Frames) were introdu-
ced by Dung in 1995 through a logic programming point of view. This point
of view persists until this day and is adopted in the majority of papers on
the subject. Given a network (S,R) as in Deﬁnition 2.1, one seeks subsets of
S called extensions, satisfying certain ﬁxed point properties. This is parallel
to the various extensions of logic programming. Caminada was the ﬁrst,
as far as I know, to present the labelling point of view, as given here in
Deﬁnition 2.1. However, the Caminada labelling point of view is still tied in
with the logic programming extensions point of view.
We need to break away from this point of view and think in terms of
labels as functions, giving values to the nodes in some algebraic or numerical
range (usually the complex or real numbers). This is the point of view of [2]
and [1] and this is what we need for the results of this paper. We are not
rejecting or even criticising the logic programming point of view, we simply
need the functional point of view to be able to prove some theorems and be
able to compare argumentation networks with other networks, following our
agenda of unifying logic and networks.
Our point of view is best explained via some examples.
Consider Figure 17. The labelling/extensions point of view will say that
this network has three extensions or three Caminada labellings.
1. a = in, b = out, c = out
2. a = out, b = in, c = out
3. a = ?, b = ?, c = ?.
Fibring Argumentation Frames 247
The functional approach will say that we are looking for a numerical or
algebraic labelling function λ(q) of nodes q ∈ S, giving values in a ﬁeld of val-
ues (the complex numbers will do) satisfying the conditions of Deﬁnition 2.1,
(written appropriately for λ) as a set of equations.
The conditions to satisfy are:
(*1) if x1, . . . , xn are all the attackers of y then λ(y) =
∏
i(1− λ(xi))
(*2) if y has no attackers then λ(y) = 1.
To present λ for Figure 17 we use values in {0, 1, 12} or values over the
complex numbers.
We get the following system of equations, using (*1) and (*2) to present
the equations:
1. λ(a) = 1− λ(b)
2. λ(c) = (1− λ(a))(1 − λ(b))
To solve the equations, let λ(a) = t
We get
1. λ(b) = 1− t
2. λ(c) = (1− t)t.
If we let t range over the values {0, 1, 12} we get the Caminada extensions
(with 12 = undecided).
We can also use values in an algebra. We deﬁne the algebra Cam as
follows:
Let {in, out, ?} be 3 values and deﬁne the operations of inverse and multi-
plication in Cam as follows:
x → x¯ (we also write c¯ ≡ (1− x))
x, y → x · y
i¯n = out
¯out = in
?¯ = ?
in ·x = x· in = x
out ·x = x· out = out
?·? =?
Note that in Cam, x2 = x, for all x.
Let us now look at Figure 18. Here, we get the equation
λ(a) = 1− λ(a)
λ(a) = 12 .
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The diﬀerence between the two points of view can be clearly separated
by the following three examples, as depicted in Figures 6, 7 and 8.
a
c b
Figure 6.
a
c b
Figure 7.
For Figure 6 we get the equations
1. λ(a) = 1− λ(c)
2. λ(c) = 1− λ(b)
3. λ(b) = 1− λ(a)
The only solution is λ(a) = λ(b) = λ(c) = 12 in the complex numbers
and ? in Cam.
For Figure 7 we get the equations
1. λ(a) = 1− λ(c)
2. λ(c) = 1− λ(b)
3. λ(b) = (1− λ(a))(1 − λ(b))
To solve, we get
4. λ(b) = (1− λ(b))2
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ba
c
b¯
b¯
Figure 8.
If our range of values is the algebra Cam then we can solve the equations by
giving the unique solution
λ(a) = λ(b) = λ(c) =?
If our range of values is the complex numbers, we can continue to solve for
λ in the complex numbers. We get the equation
λ(b)2 − 3λ(b) + 1 = 0
and solve
λ(b) = 1.5±
√
1.25
The other values for λ(a) and λ(c) can be calculated.
The important point is that we can tell the diﬀerence between Figure 6
and 7, by choosing the right range for λ.
The Caminada labelling will give the nodes a, b, c value ? = undecided
in both cases and will not be able to tell the diﬀerence. The argumentation
theorist may not care about the diﬀerence between the two ﬁgures. Both
are incoherent. He may concede that the functional point of view may
be of interest in comparing with other networks but as far as the area of
argumentation itself is concerned, he may believe that we do not need this
new point of view.
In fact, however, the functional point of view does make a diﬀerence for
argumentation theory itself. Figure 8 is the example for that.
Let us write the equations:
1. λ(b) = 1− λ(a)
2. λ(b¯) = 1− λ(b)
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3. λ(b¯) = 1− λ(b¯) = λ(b).
4. λ(c) = (1− λ(b))(1 − λ(b¯)) = (1− λ(b))(1 − λ(b)).
Note that from (2) and (3) we get that
5. λ(c) = (1− λ(b))2
Working in the complex numbers, let λ(a) = t and use it as a parameter.
Then
1. λ(b) = 1− t
2. λ(b¯ = t
3. λ(b¯) = 1− t
4. λ(c) = t2
Working in Cam we observe the following when comparing Figure 8 with
Figure 17.
Ignoring the nodes b¯ and b¯, we get that Figure 17 is a subnetwork of
Figure 8. In fact the equations we get for Figure 8 for the nodes a, b, c would
be the same equations as those of Figure 8 provided that (1 − λ(b)) · (1 −
λ(b)) = (1−λ(b)) holds. Indeed, this equation does hold for Cam. So as far
as Cam is concerned Figure 8 is a conservative extension of Figure 17. Any
λ on {a, b, c} can be uniquely extended to a λ∗ on Figure 8 in a consistent
manner. The equations for Figure 8 give the same solutions to the nodes of
Figure 17 as the solutions to the equations of Figure 17.
Let us consider another example, that of Figure 50.
We get the following equations:
1. λ(x¯) = 1− λ(x)
2. λ(a¯) = 1− λ(a)
3. λ(c¯) = 1− λ(c)
4. λ(e(x, a)) = (1− λ(a¯))(1− λ(x¯) = λ(a)λ(x)
5. λ(e(x, c)) = (1 − λ(x¯))(1− λ(c¯)) = λ(x)λ(c)
6. λ(a¯) = 1− λ(a¯)
7. λ(c¯) = 1− λ(c¯)
8. λ(e(x)) = (1− λ(a¯))(1 − λ(c¯))(1 − λ(x¯))
9. λ(a) = (1− λ(e(x)))(1 − λ(e(x, c)))
10. λ(c) = (1− λ(e(x)))(1 − λ(e(x, a))).
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Simplifying, we get
4. λ(e(x, a)) = λ(a) · λ(x)
5. λ(e(x, c)) = λ(c) · λ(x)
6. λ(a¯) = λ(a)
7. λ(c¯) = λ(c)
8. λ(e(x)) = (1− λ(a))(1 − λ(c))λ(x)
9. λ(a) = [1− [λ(x)(1 − λ(a))(1 − λ(c))]] · [1− λ(x)λ(c)]
10. λ(c) = [1− [λ(x)(1 − λ(a))(1 − λ(c))] · [1− λ(x)λ(a)]
Let us, for example, see what we get if we substitute in the equations
the values x =? a = in and c =?.
First note that from equations (1)–(8) we get that the values for x¯, a¯, c¯,
e(x, a), e(x, c), a¯, c¯ and e(x) are uniquely determined. The problem we face
is whether our choice of the above values for {x, a, c} is fortunate so that
equations (9) and (10) also hold.
Let us check. We get
1. x¯ =?
2. a¯ = out
3. c¯ =?
4. e(x, a) = (1− out)(1−) = in·? =?
5. e(x, c) = (1−?)(1−?) =?·? =?
6. a¯ = in
7. c¯ =?
8. e(x) = (1− in)(1−?)(1−?) = out ·? = out
9. a = (1− out)(1−?) = in·? =?
10. c = (1− out)(1−?) = in·? =?
We get that equation 9 is contradictory. So we guessed wrong!
2.3. Joint and disjunctive attacks
We are faced with the need to make sense of situation illustrated in Figure 9
as an example.
We got Figure 9 by substituting the network of Figure 10 for the posi-
tion q in the network of Figure 11.
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y
c
q
x a b
Figure 9.
a
c
b
Figure 10.
We need to answer Questions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 for this case. It is a simple
case since the substituted network of Figure 10 has no loops and so it has a
clear message, only one extension: a is in, c is in and b is out. So eﬀectively
b is out and plays no active ‘in’ role in the network.
We must clarify our concepts at this junction: Figure 9 shows a substi-
tution of the network of Figure 10 at position q of Figure 11.
The ﬁrst choice of options we have to do is to ask Question 5.
(*1) Do we process the network of Figure 10 ﬁrst, i.e. choose an extension
for it and then and only then substitute the result for q in Figure 11?
(Call this Option 1.),
or
(*2) We substitute Figure 10 as is, as a network, and deﬁne whatever is
supposed to happen (call this Option 2).
If we follow option 1 for the network of Figure 10, we get the network of
Figure 12. It is as if we substitute the set {a, c} for the node q in Figure 11.
We begin by examining Option 1 and study the formal network of Figure
12. We need to decide how to deﬁne the concepts of attacks (see Figure 13).
Figure 12 has two problematic parts, {a, c} attacking y and x attacking
{a, c}, as shown in Figure 13.
(*3) What does it mean for a unit (argument) x to attack a set {a, c}?
(*4) What does it mean for a set {a, c} to attack a unit (argument) y?
The case (*4) is easy. For {a, c} to be in we must have both a and c in.
In this case y is out. See Figures 13 and 14.
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x q y
Figure 11.
a, c yx
Figure 12.
For the case of (*3), when the unit {a, c} is attacked by x, we have two
possibilities:
Possibility 1 for (*3)
x must attack one of the elements of the set i.e. either x attacks a or x
attacks b.
Possibility 2 for (*3)
x attacks the “in” status of {a, b}, that is we need to have either a out or
b out.
Possibility 2 is the symmetrical counterpart to (*4). For {a, c} to be in
we must have “a is in and b is in”, therefore for {a, c} to be out we must
have “a is out or c is out”.
The two possibilities are not equivalent.
This will be discussed in detail at the beginning of Section 3 and in
Section 4.2. We shall see later that Nielsen and Parsons [20, 19] proposed
joint attacks, which is coming from a completely diﬀerent point of view,
follows possibility 1. We shall compare our approaches in Section 4.2.
Definition 2.2 (Joint and disjunctive attacks). We adopt possibility 2 for
(*3). So the deﬁnition is as follows (see Figure 15).
• x attacks {e1, . . . , em} (disjunctively) means:
x = in implies
∨m
i=1 ei = out
(especially this can mean that if x is in then several or more ei are out).
• {e1, . . . , em} (jointly) attack y means:∧m
i=1 ei = in implies y is out.
• {e1, . . . , em} is in iﬀ
∧m
i=1 ei = in
• {e1, . . . , em} is out iﬀ
∨m
i=1 ei = out
Example 2.3 (Caminada–Gabbay labelling for joint and disjunctive at-
tacks). We illustrate/deﬁne our labelling using the typical case of Figure 15.
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x a, c ya, c ;
Figure 13.
x
a
c
y
Figure 14.
1. If x is labelled in and ej, j = 1, . . . , k are the nodes being disjunctively
attacked from x then at least one of ej must be out.
2. If y is jointly attacked from ej , j = 1, . . . , k and all of ej are in then y
must be out.
3. Suppose q is targeted by a disjunctive attack from x1, . . . , xn. How can
q be undecided? To see what must be done consider Figure 16 showing
a typical situation, where q is attacked from two diﬀerent directions.
In Figure 16, q is being attacked from two diﬀerent directions. One attack
is emanating from x and one attack emanating from y. The attack emanating
from x involves also v1 and v2 which are also being disjunctively attacked and
the attack emanating from y involves also w1 and w2. We imagine Figure
16 as a subnetwork of a larger network N. So it is quite possible that x or vi
or wj are being attacked from other parts of the network. We assume that
q is being attacked only from x and y.
Let us consider an arbitrary attack on q, emanating from a node z and
involving nodes u1, . . . , uk which are also attacked. Thus to be explicit, z
disjunctively attacks {u1, . . . , uk, q}.
e1
yx
ek
...
...
...
Figure 15.
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Let us use the terminology that q is subject to an attack emanating
from z. We now want to deﬁne three concepts describing this attack.
(1) the attack on q emanating from z is not a threat to q.
(2) the attack from q emanating from z forces q out
(3) the attack on q emanating from z makes q undecided.
Let us deﬁne these three concepts:
(1) This attack is not going to be a threat to q if one of u1, . . . , uk is out.
Say ui is out because of an attack on it from the rest of the network
N, in which Figure 16 is embedded. If one of the ui is out then the
attack succeeds without ‘hitting’ q. So this attack is no threat to q
and q can have any value, in, out or undecided.
(2) the attack on q from z forces q out if z = in and all of u1, . . . , uk are
in.
(3) when do we say that the attack on q from the direction of z makes q
undecided? There are two cases:
(a) z itself is undecided. So we do not know whether z is in or out. If
some ui is out then it does not matter that z is undecided. q is not
threatened. If all of ui are not out, but are either in or undecided,
then there is a real possibility of attack on q. If z and all of ui turns
out to be in then q must be out and if one of {z, u1, . . . , uk} is out
then q can be in. Thus we must make q undecided.
Now we ask can u1 be in? Well, it cannot be in because from the
point of view of u1, we see the same situation as that which we saw
from q. We see z =? and u1, . . . , uk and q are not out. So u1 must also
be undecided. So to maintain coherence of our rules we must declare
(*) below:
(*) If a disjunctive attack emanates from z in the direction of u1, . . . ,
uk, q and z is undecided and none of u1, . . . , uk,
q is out (u1, . . . , uk, q can be out owing to attacks from the rest
of the network) then u1, . . . , uk, q are all undecided. Let us refer to
this situation as ui, q become undecided because of a disjunctive
attack on it emanating from an undecided z.
(b) Let us now check what happens if z = in. Can we still get q =
undecided? The answer is yes. Suppose u1, . . . , uk are all attacked
from some respective z1, . . . , zk which are all undecided. This will
make u1, . . . , uk undecided according to (*) above.
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x y
w2w1
qv2v1
Figure 16.
So if u1 . . . or . . .uk ends up out, then q is safe, and if all of u1, . . . , uk
end up in, then q has to be out. Thus we must declare q undecided.
So we get rule (**) below:
(**) If a disjunctive attack emanates from z in the direction of u1, . . . ,
uk, q and at least one of ui is undecided (because for example of a
disjunctive attack on ui emanating from an undecided zi) then all
of u1, . . . , uk, q are all undecided.
We can now deﬁne what it means for q to be undecided, by using (*)
and (**):
(***) q is undecided if
(1) q is not forced out by any attack on it emanating from any z.
(2) q can be shown undecided by repeated applications of (*) and
(**) above.
Let us now check when v1 can be undecided in Figure 16 v1 can be
undecided in Figure 16 if for example x is undecided and there are no
attacks that force any of v1, v2 or q out.
v1 can be undecided if x = in but y is undecided and there are no
attacks forcing any of v1, v2, q, w1, w2 out.
Now having adopted our notion of disjunctive and joint attacks in De-
ﬁnition 2.2, we are ready to discuss further whether to adopt Option 1 for
network substitution, namely whether to choose an extension for the network
ﬁrst before we substitute and then substitute only the nodes that are in
in that extension. This discussion will be somewhat lengthy (terminating
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c
a b
Figure 17.
a
Figure 18.
just before Deﬁnition 2.4) and will result in rejecting option 1 in favour of
option 2. The weakness of option 1 is that it gets complex in the presence
of loops.
The above considerations explained what happens with option 1 when
the substituted network has no loops so it has no undecided nodes and
therefore it has only one extension. What do we do when the substituted
network has loops? There are two typical cases to consider, as shown in
Figures 17, 18.
Figure 20 is obtained by substituting Figure 17 into Figure 19 at node q
and Figure 21 is obtained by substituting Figure 18 into Figure 19, at node q.
In the ﬁrst case we have two options for the network, the extensions {a, c}
and {b, c}. Which one do we take? This is not really a problem because we
can push the problem onto the labelling. So depending on the labelling we
get either Figure 19 or Figure 23 we still have the problem of how do we
represent the original network?
Let us try the representation as in Figure 24.
If a is in and c is in, we have a case of {a, c} and so since x must be
in, its attack on {a, c} must take one of {a, c} out. Similarly if b is in and
q yx
Figure 19.
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c
a b
x y
Figure 20.
a
x y
Figure 21.
a, c yx
Figure 22.
yx
b, c
Figure 23.
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a
c
b
x y
Figure 24.
c is in, we have a case of {b, c} and so since x must be in, its attack on {b, c}
must take one of {b, c} out.
We immediately see that we have a problem with the proposed repre-
sentation of Figure 24. In the ﬁgure we put in the entire network of Figure
17 into Figure 19. Thus when b is in, a is out and when a is in we have
that b is out. So formally, for the case let us say, that {a, c} are in and b is
out, we set that the attack from x is formally successful, because in our dia-
grams for this case b is out so {a, c} can stay in, contrary to our intentions!
Similarly, since always either a or b is out then the substituted network can
never attack anything as represented in the diagram of Figure 24 because
formally the joint attack from {a, b, c} always has one node out (either a
or b). Obviously, we need ﬁrst to calculate the result for the substituted
network of Figure 17 and get say that {a, c} are in and b is out and only
afterwards address the attack from x and the attack on y.
But then in this case we must make it clear that b, being out does not
play a role in the considerations of these attacks.
‘Making things clear’ means additional labels. Maybe several kinds of
annotated ‘out’ with information when each ‘out’ is to be taken into account.
The labelling and the substitutions become hierarchical.
This is not good, not only because of complexity considerations but also
conceptually. When we substitute we allow ourselves to use any arguments,
so this b in question could be x. Now what do we do? In the hierarchical
evaluation the b = x inside Figure 17 as substituted is out while the b = x
originally outside the ﬁgure is in. But they are the same b = x! So what do
we do?
Let us look at Figure 21 and see if we can get a clue as to what to do.
Figure 18, as substituted into Figure 19 is both attacking (Figure 25) and is
being attacked (Figure 26). So what do we do with Figures 25 and 26?
The latter, Figure 26 is clear, x can take a out.
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y
Figure 25.
a
x
Figure 26.
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N′ = ba
Figure 27.
On the other hand, we look at Figure 25, then since a is undecided, we
must give y undecided. Now we can see that the proposed hierarchical eval-
uation, when applied to Figure 21 is no good. Evaluating hierarchically will
make a undecided, y undecided and x in which is not a good solution for
Figure 21. However, evaluating directly without any hierarchical considera-
tions gives us that x is in, since it is not attacked, a is out and y is in. All
nice and clear.
The above discussion shows that we had better reject Option 1 and view
any substituted network N′ into another network N at a point q ∈ N, in
which q attacks another node y ∈ N, as a joint attack from all the arguments
of N′. If some of them are out in N′ then we regard N′ as not conﬂict-free.
Thus the network of Figure 27 is not conﬂict-free.
The reason we take this view is because when we substitute N′ of Figure
27 into another network N, b and a may be in N in other places and we do
not know what can happen, a may end up out or b in.
The above is our Option 2 which we shall adopt.
We now have an agreed sequence of deﬁnitions.
Definition 2.4 (Higher level networks).
1. Let S = ∅ be a set of nodes. Let S0 be the family of all ﬁnite non-empty
subsets of S, identify the singleton {x} with x for simplicity of notation.
2. A higher level argumentation network has the form (S, S0, R) where S
and S0 are as above and R ⊆ S0 × S0 is the attack relation.
XRY represents a joint attack from the set X disjunctively attacking
the set Y . When X = {x} and Y = {y} we get an ordinary point to
point attack and so when R ⊆ S×S we get the usual network deﬁnition.
We represent the situation as in Figure 28
X = {x1, . . . , xn}.
Y = {y1, . . . , yn}.
or perhaps Figure 29 is more clear.
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...
...
x1
xn
y1
ym
Figure 28.
Disjunctive
ym
y1
Joint
x1
xn
...
Figure 29.
3. We understand Figure 28 as saying that the set {x1, . . . , xn} is jointly
mounting a disjunctive attack on the set {y1, . . . , ym}. So only if all the
xi are in can the attack go forward and in which case we expect at least
one of the yj to be out.
We now want to deﬁne substitution of one such higher level network into
another. The result will again be a higher level network.
We will understand better how to deﬁne the substitution after we do
some examples.
Example 2.5 (Network substitution). Start with a simple network of
Figure 30.
x y
Figure 30.
Now substitute Figure 31 for y and substitute Figure 32 for x and get
Figure 33.
Figure 33 should be written as Figure 34.
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u v
Figure 31.
u a
Figure 32.
Now substitute Figure 35 for u in Figure 34 and get Figure 36.
Note that in Figure 36 we have a joint attack of a and ‘a → x’ on some
target. According to our Option 2, we regard this as a joint attack from
{a} ∪ {a, x} on the target, i.e. a joint attack from {a, x}.
Of course Figure 36 needs to be simpliﬁed since a is written twice. We
get Figure 37.
We numbered the attacks in Figures 36 and 37 so it will be clear what
attack in Figure 36 became what attack in Figure 37.
We try as an exercise to substitute for u in Figure 34, a new ﬁgure,
Figure 38. So instead of substituting Figure 31 as we did above, we substitute
Figure 38.
In this case we get Figure 39.
Now this ﬁgure needs to be simpliﬁed to Figure 40. In Figure 40 we have:
1 is a joint attack of {a, v} on v
2 is a joint attack of {a, v} on a
3 is a joint attack of {a, v} which disjunctively targets a and v.
Remark 2.6. We can see that the graphs can get very complex. We note,
however, that we cannot get everything, just by repeated substitution. For
example, we believe we cannot get Figure 41 by mere substitutions:
We cannot get that x sends a disjunctive attack in the direction of a and
in the direction of c but the attack disjunct going towards c joins forces and
becomes conjunctive with the attack from b on c.
The only possibilities we can generate are Figures 42 and 43.
Figure 41 is perfectly OK, but I don’t think we can get it by repeated
substitution of ordinary networks. Figure 41 has three extensions:
1. x = in, a = out, b = in, c =out
2. x = in, a = in, b = in, c =out
3. x = in, a = out, b = in, c = in.
It is debatable whether extensions (2) and (3) are acceptable. This de-
pends on how we understand Figure 41. See section 4 for a discussion.
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u a u v
Figure 33.
u va
Figure 34.
We must bear in mind that we are not just deﬁning generalisations of
argumentation networks from a mathematical point of view. We are follow-
ing the methodological manifesto of Section 1 and there are good reasons
for substituting one network in another. We asked ourselves in Section 2
what general notion of networks we need to allow for substitution. That is
when we substitute such a network in another such network, we get a result
of the same kind. We found that we need the notion of higher level network
of Deﬁnition 2.4. So generalising the deﬁnition of higher level networks, to
allow for Figure 41 requires independent conceptual justiﬁcation. Substitu-
tion is justiﬁed intuitively. Joint attacks exists in common sense arguments.
Attacking joint attacks also makes sense and this gives rise to disjunctive
attacks. How can the mathematical situation of Figure 41 be justiﬁed or
explained?
We can intuitively say that the disjunctive attack arises from an attack
on a joint unit such as x attack on {a, c} in Figure 13. To be successful, x
wants either a or c to be out. So why not joint forces with some b to attack
c and increase his chances? This makes sense. We get Figure 41. x will not
insist on c = out if his attack on a succeeds. In Figure 43, {x, b} insist on
c = out even if a = out. In Figure 43, {x, b} attack on c is not part of a
joint attack.
Let us postpone this to the discussion to Section 4.
We can now deﬁne higher level substitution.
a x
Figure 35.
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x
2 1
a v
3
3
3
3 3
a
Figure 36.
x v
a
2
3
3
3
3
1
Figure 37.
a v
Figure 38.
v
2 1
a v
3
a
Figure 39.
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3
Figure 40.
a c
x b
Figure 41.
a c
x b
Figure 42.
a c
x b
Figure 43.
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Definition 2.7. Let Pi = (Si, S
0
i , Ri) for i = 1, 2 be two ﬁnite higher level
networks. Let x ∈ S1 be a node. We want to deﬁne the network
P = P1(x/P2)
being the result of the substitution of P2 for x in P1.
The set of points of P is S = S1∪S2. We need to deﬁne R ⊆ S0×S0. We
shall follow the traditional practice used in substitution in logic and assume
that x itself is not present in S2.
We therefore have two types of available relations.
1. Type 1 from P1:
{a1, . . . , am, x}R1{b1, . . . , bk, x}
where x may not appear among the ai or not appear among the bj . In
this case we take
{a1, . . . , am} ∪ S2R{b1, . . . , bk} ∪ S2
where S2 will appear wherever x appears.
2. Type 2 from P2
XR2Y
in which case we take XRY .
We have thus really deﬁned R to be
R =def R2 ∪R1(x/S2)
with the understanding that {ej , S2} = {ej} ∪ S2.
Example 2.8. Let us examine again the network in Figure 41. We claimed
that such a network cannot arise in our deﬁnition of higher level networks.
Since clearly a and c are being attacked and x and b are the attacking
nodes, then only the following higher level attacks are possible in the form
XRY , as shown in Figure 45.
Figure 45 shows the connections of Figure 44 using points as nodes. It
is clear that the attack pattern of Figure 41 is not present in Figure 45.
Definition 2.9 (Caminada–Gabbay labelling). Let P = (S, S0, R) be a
higher order network.
Let λ be a function giving values in {0, 1, ?} to each s ∈ S.
We say this function is a proper labelling iﬀ the following holds.
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{x} {b} {x, b}
{a, c}{c}
Figure 44.
c
x
a
b
Figure 45.
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1. If XRY holds and ∀x ∈ X(λ(x) = 1) then ∃y ∈ Y λ(y) = 0).
2. If for every X,Y such that y ∈ Y and XRY holds we have that ∃x ∈ X
s.t. λ(x) = 0 then λ(y) = 1.
3. If for all X,Y such that y ∈ X ∪ Y and XRY ∪ {y}, we have that
∀z ∈ X ∪ Y (λ(z) ∈ {1, ?}) and ∃z ∈ X ∪ Y (λ(z) =?). Then λ(y) =?.
Remark 2.10. Figure 46. If λ(x) = 1 and λ(a) = 0 then λ(c) can be either 1
or 0. Both cases are acceptable. If Figure 46 is part of a larger network and
because of attacks from the larger network either λ(x) =? then we cannot
have λ(a) = 1 and λ(c) =?.
3. Methodological results
We are now in a position where we have a deﬁnition of a new kind of ar-
gumentation network, (S, S0, R) as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 2.4, where sets of
arguments can attack sets of arguments. Never mind how this deﬁnition
was motivated. We got such networks because we wanted our networks to
be closed under ﬁbring/substitution (Deﬁnition 2.7). The question now is,
what are the extensions of this new kind of network? We need to do Dung
style analysis of extensions, or develop some other means of answering this
question.
Given E ⊆ S, is E an extension? Let us see what we need to do Dung
style; something like the following:
The attacks are done by sets of arguments on sets of arguments. So we
need to deﬁne the notion of a conﬂict free family E of sets of arguments.
Then we deﬁne the notion of a set X of arguments being acceptable to E.
Then we deﬁne a function ϕ
ϕ(E) = {X | X is acceptable to E}
Then we say that E is admissible if E ⊆ ϕ(E) and now we can deﬁne exten-
sions, e.g. E is complete iﬀ E = ϕ(E). E is a family of subsets of the set of
arguments S. From E maybe we get the extensions say
E =
⋃
X∈E
X
At this point we do not know if this can work or not. We need to try it
and develop the correct deﬁnitions by trial and error. We are not going
to do that. We are going to take another route. We are going to start
with (S, S0, R) and add new points S∗ to S and get a new network S ∪ S∗.
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We deﬁne an ordinary R∗ on S ∪S∗ and then embed our network (S, S0, R)
into the network (S∪S∗, R∗) by implementing the idea of joint and disjuctive
attacks using the additional points of S∗.
The new network (S ∪ S∗, R∗) is an ordinary Dung network, so it has
extensions. Let E∗ be an extension. We will deﬁne any E = E∗ ∩ S, as
an extension of (S, S0, R). For this to work properly we need the following
critical property:
Critical property of S in S ∪ S∗
Let λ∗1 and λ
∗
2 be two Caminada labelling on S ∪ S∗. Assume that λ∗1  S =
λ2  S, then λ1 = λ2.
The critical property of S in S ∪ S∗ ensures the embedding is faithful!
So now that we know what we are doing, let’s roll!
We now reduce higher level networks to ordinary networks. We do this
in several stages.
1. Reduce the disjunctive attacks to joint attacks.
2. Reduce the joint attacks to single attacks.
3. Derive the existence of labellings and extensions from (1) and (2).
3.1. Conceptual analysis of disjunctive attacks
Before we embark on any reductions, we must fully clarify the properties of
disjunctive attacks.
Consider the disjunctive attack part of Figure 13. We have the following
situation (see Figure 46):
• x = in implies a = out or c = out
The following are the three possibilities
1. x = in, a = in, c = out
2. x = in, a = out, c = in
3. x = in, a = out, c = out
Figure 46 cannot be reduced to Figure 47 which is properly written as
Figure 48.
Figure 48 does not allow for the extension
4. x = in, a = out, c = out
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x
ca
Figure 46.
a
c
x, c
x, a
Figure 47.
The meaning of Figure 46 is a disjunctive attack on {a, c} and not any
speciﬁc attack on either a or c. This is also reﬂected in the problems we had
in interpreting Figure 41.
We have three reading of Figure 46.
(r1) x attacks the coalition (joint) of {a, c}. x would be happy to see
either a = out or c = out but is not mounting any speciﬁc attacks
on a or on c. According to this interpretation Figure 41 does not
have meaning. b cannot join any attack from x onto c. There is
no such attack.
(r2) x sends two attacks, one in the direction of a and one in the di-
rection of c. x is happy if at least one of them is successful, but
would also be happy with both successful.
(r3) x sends two attacks as in (r2) above but does not want both to
succeed, only one.
(r1) and (r2) above say:
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a x c
Figure 48.
• x = in implies a = out or c = out
while (r3) says:
• x = in implies (a = out ∧c = in) or (a = in and c = out).
Figure 48 corresponds to (r3).
Note that we need not make a choice between (r1) and (r2) for the
purpose of this section. We shall see in Section 4.2 that for the purpose of
explaining Figure 41 we need to adopt (r2).
How can we represent (1) or (2)? What is the corresponding ﬁgure?
We need auxiliary points. Consider Figure 49:
a x c
a¯ c¯
Figure 49.
Figure 49 extends Figure 48 by adding two joint attacks from {a = out,
c = out} one on a and one on c. To do this properly we use the help of two
new intermediary points a¯ and c¯. When a = out and c = out, we get a¯ =in
and c¯ =in and {a¯, c¯} mount the joint attacks on a and c.
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Let us see what happens in Figure 49. Since x is not attacked, x = in.
We now consider our possibilities for a and c. If at least one of {a, c} is
in, the joint attacks of {a¯, c¯} fail and we are back to Figure 48. Figure 48
behaves as we want except in the case of a =out and c = out. But in this
case, a¯ = b¯ = in and so the joint attacks of {a¯, c¯} on a and c must succeed,
thus conﬁrming the assumption that a = b = out.
We can display the situation without joint attacks in Figure 50.
e(x)
a¯ c¯
e(x, a) e(x, c)
a a¯ x x¯ c c¯
Figure 50.
We used auxiliary points as follows:
1. With each node involved, x, a, c we added new nodes x¯, a¯, c¯ and a¯, c¯.
2. We added the intermediaries e(x), e(x, c), e(x, a).
Nodes x, a, c attack only via x¯, a¯, c¯ respectively.
e(x, a) is an intermediary doing the job of (x, a) attack on c. Similarly
e(x, c) is an intermediary for representing the attack of (x, c) on a.
These two represent the situation of Figure 48. To get also the option of
x = in, a = out, c = out, we use a¯, c¯ which attack e(x). a¯ attacks a¯ and c¯
attacks c¯.
Example 3.1 (Analysis of Figure 50). Figure 50 can be stand-alone or can
be embedded inside a larger Figure. If Figure 50 is stand-alone, then x is
the only node which is not attacked by anything. Hence x = in. Therefore
x¯ = out. We now examine four options for a and c:
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1. a = out, c =out
2. a = in, c = out
3. a = out, c = in
4. a = in, c = in
We check consistency of the in–out labelling, for the case x = 1.
Case 1
If a = c = out, we get a¯ = c¯ = in. Therefore e(x, a) = e(x, c) = a¯ = c¯ = out.
Also e(x) = in.
e(x) attacks a and c conﬁrming they should be out.
So (1) is a consistent labelling.
Case 2
If a = in and c = out then a¯ = out and c¯ = in. Hence e(x, a) = in (it has
not attackers, both x¯ and a¯ are out) and e(x, c) is out.
Since e(, a) = in and e(x, a) attacks c it conﬁrms c is out.
Since a¯ is out we get a¯ is in, therefore e(x) is out. Hence a is not attacked
by anything (both e(x) and e(x, c) are out), conﬁrming that a is in.
We also get c¯ is out in c¯ is in. This does not aﬀect e(x), because a¯ is in
and so e(x) is out.
Case 3
This is the case of a = out and c = in. It is the mirror image of Case 2 and
follows from the symmetry of the Figure with a and c swapped.
Case 4
This is where a = in and c = in. This case should come out inconsistent.
Indeed, in this case both a¯, b¯ are out.
Hence since x¯ = out we get e(x, a) and e(x, c) are in and since they attack
c and a respectively, c and a cannot be in. An inconsistency. We also have
that a¯, c¯ are in and d(x) is out.
We now need to check what happens when Figure 50 is embedded inside a
larger network. Figure 50 arose from the attempt to eliminate the disjunctive
attack of Figure 46. So if Figure 46 is part of a larger network then Figure
50 will also be in the larger network. However, the larger network interacts
(attacks or is being attacked) only by {x, a, c} and not the new points. So it
is crucial for us to show that if the labels of {x, a, c} are ﬁxed by the larger
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network then the labels of the new points are unique and they are consistent
with the labels of {x, a, c}.
Lemma 3.2. In Figure 50, if we ﬁx the value {in, ?, out} of {a, c, x} then the
value of the other points {a¯, c¯, x¯, a¯, c¯, e(x), e(x, a), e(x, c)} are also uniquely
ﬁxed, and are consistent with the values of {a, c, x}.
Proof. We need to show that if the values of {a, c, x} are ﬁxed then the
values of the new points are uniquely determined.
Let N be a general network in which Figure 46 is a subnetwork. This
means that there may be attacks on {a, c, x} from other nodes of the network
N, say from {d1, . . . , dk} and also that there may be attacks emanating from
{a, c, x} individually or jointly with others onto nodes {d′1, . . . , d′k′} in N.
We are now replacing in N Figure 46 by Figure 50. The word ‘replacing’
is not accurate. Figure 46 (i.e. the subnetwork of N comprising of nodes
{a, c, x} and the connections between them) remains in N, we are adding
new points and connections to Figure 46 to form Figure 50 a part of N.
We want to show that any acceptable labelling λ on N which gives values
to {a, c, x} can be uniquely extended to the new points of Figure 50 in a
manner consistent with λ. Call the new extension λ∗.
We need to make a case analysis on the values of λ(a), λ(c), λ(x).
We have to check all cases. We follow the cases in three groups x = 1, x =
0 and x =?. For each group we check all cases of a and c as in Table 1.
Group x = in
Table 1 suggests 9 cases for a and c. However not all are possible in N. Since
λ is an acceptable labelling and x = in, only cases in which either a = out
or c = out are possible.
Thus we need examine only cases 1, 2, 3, 5, 8. Cases 1, 2, 3 have already
been examined in Example 3.1. They are OK and are internally consistent.
Cases 5 and 8 are completely symmetrical (since Figure 50 is symmetrical
in a and c). So we need examine only Case 5.
Case 5
a = out, c =?
First we see which values for the new points are forced by this case.
a = out ⇒ a¯ = in
a¯ = in⇒ a¯ = out
a¯ = in⇒ e(x, a) = out.
Claim
e(x) cannot be in!
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Table 1.
case c a
1 out out
2 out in
3 in out
4 in in
5 ? out
6 ? in
7 in ?
8 out ?
9 ? ?
Otherwise, since a¯ = out then if e(x) were in then c¯ = out, hence c¯ = in
hence c is out. But we are given that c =?. So e(x) is not in.
Therefore, since e(x, a) = out and e(x) is either out or ? we have a
situation which is consistent with c =?. We now use the fact that c =? to
get c¯ =? and hence c¯ =?, and hence e(x) =?. This establishes a unique value
for e(x). We continue, since c¯ = out and c¯ =?, we get e(x, c) =?.
We have that e(x, c) attacks a. Does this contradict a = out? The answer
is no. a is out because of some attack from N. So we got for Case 5 unique
consistent values for the new points.
Group x = out
Since x = out, there are no attacks from x on a and c, therefore all values
of {a, c} of Table 1 are possible. We have to examine all cases.
We begin by checking what values are forced on the new points by the
fact that x = out. We get
x = out ⇒ x¯ = in
x¯ = in ⇒ e(x, a) = e(x, c) = e(x) = out
Since there are no attacks from the new points of Figure 50 on the points
{a, c}, their value consistently stand in the expanded network.
Iif λ = 1, 0, ? use the notation 1 − λ to mean −, 1, ? respectively. Thus
the value of a¯ is determined as 1− λ(a) and the value of c¯ is determined as
1− λ(c). Thus the value of a¯ is the same as the value of a and the value of
c¯ is the same as the value of c.
Hence for all cases of Table 1 we see that the values of the new points
are unique and are consistent with the values of {a, c} for our group case of
x = out.
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Group x =?
If x =? and x disjunctively attacks a and c, we cannot have the case of
a = c = in, because maybe x can be in. Similarly we cannot have the cases
of a = in, c =? nor a =? and c = in.
So let us see ﬁrst what we can get which holds for all cases
x =?⇒ x¯ =?
This is all we can get.
We have to check cases 1–3, 5, 8, 9.
Case 1
c = out and a = out.
a = out ⇒ a¯ = in and e(x, a) = out
c = out⇒ c¯ = in and e(x, c) = out
a¯ = in ⇒ a¯ = out
c¯ = in⇒ c¯ = out
x¯ =? and a¯ = c¯ = out ⇒ e(x) =?
Now a and c are out, they are attacked by e(x) =?. This is still consistent.
So this case is OK.
Case 2
c = out and a = in.
c¯ = out⇒ c¯ = in
c¯ = in⇒ c¯ = out
c¯ = in→ e(x, c) = out
a = in ⇒ a¯ = out
a¯ = out ⇒ a¯ = in and e(x, a) = out
a¯ = in ⇒ e(x) = out.
We now get unique values for the new points. We have consistency
because there are no attacks on {a, c} from the new points.
Case 3
c = in and a = out.
This is the symmetrical case of Case 2.
Case 5
c =? and a = out.
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We have x =? and x¯ =?
a = out⇒ a¯ = in
a¯ = in⇒ e(x, a) = out
c =?⇒ c¯ =?
x¯ =? and c¯ =?⇒ e(x, c) =?
a¯ = in⇒ a¯ = out
c¯ =?⇒ c¯ =?
a¯ = out and c¯ =?⇒ e(x) =?
We now got unique values for all new points. Do we have consistency?
a = out is attacked by
e(x) = e(x, c) =?
Hence a remains out. We have consistency here.
c =? is attacked by e(x, a) = out, so we maintain consistency.
Case 8
c = out and a =?
This case is symmetrical with Case 5, with a and c interchanged. By sym-
metry it is OK.
Case 9
a =? and c =?
In this case we get everything has value ? and we have no problem.
The situation of moving from Figure 46 to Figure 50 is typical and the
fact that we dealt with an attack from x on {a, c} and we did not deal
with attacks from a general set X = {x1, . . . , xn} on a general set Y =
{y1, . . . , ym} does not incur any loss of generality. In the general case we
proceed similarly. We need to add the auxiliary points y¯1(X), . . . , y¯m(X)
add attacks of yi on y¯i(X) and add joint attacks as in Figure 51.
3.2. Eliminating disjunctive and joint attacks
We are now ready, following our conceptual discussion in Section 3.1, to give
a series of deﬁnitions and Lemmas showing how networks with joint and
disjunctive attacks can be reduced to ordinary Dung networks with only
point-to-point attacks. The reduction is done with the help of auxiliary
points, using the intuition described in Figure 52.
Definition 3.3 (Critical subsets). Let Pi = (Si, Ri) be two networks. Sup-
pose all points of network P2 are embedded inside network P1. So S2 is
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X ∪ (Y − {y1}) X ∪ (Y − {ym}), . . . ,
y1 ym
y¯1(X) y¯m(X). . .
. . .
. . .
Joint attack of
{y¯1, . . . , y¯m}
Joint attack of
{y¯1, . . . , y¯m}
Figure 51.
Network
P1
Network P2
Figure 52.
a subset of S1. We say that S2 is a critical subset of S1 iﬀ every Caminada
labelling on S2 can be extended uniquely to a labelling on S1. This means
that the additional nodes of S1 only help clarify what is going on in S2
and do not add any additional information. Any Caminada labellings of S1
which agree on S2 must be equal.
This sort of characterisation is known from model theory. A set of classi-
cal models M2 in a language L2 is said to be EC∆ iﬀ it can be characterised
as the set of all models of a ﬁrst-order theory ∆2 of L2. The set of models
is said to be PC∆ iﬀ we can extend the language L2 such that the set there
exists a theory ∆1 in the language L1 such that any model m2 of M2 can
be obtained as the restriction m2 = m1  L2 to L2 of a unique model m1
of ∆1. Furthermore, all restrictions to L2 of models of ∆1 are models of ∆2.
We are now ready to push on with our reduction.
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X
b1 . . . bn
Figure 53.
Definition 3.4 (Eliminating disjunctive attacks). Let P = (S, S0, R). Let
S1 = S ∪ {s¯(X)|s ∈ S,X ⊆ S,X = ∅}.
Let P1 = (S1, S
0
1 , R1) be deﬁned as follows, see Figure 51:
1. Let XR1a if XRa holds.
2. If XRY holds then let X ∪ (Y − {y})R1y hold for every y ∈ Y .
3. Let sR1s¯(X) hold for every s ∈ S,X ⊆ S,X = ∅
4. If XRY holds let {y¯(X)|y ∈ Y }R1y hold of each y ∈ Y .
Lemma 3.5. For any λ : S → {0, 1, ?} we have that λ is proper labelling on
P iﬀ λ is proper on P1.
Proof. One can give a direct proof of this theorem by working directly of
Figure 51, converting it to the analog of Figure 50. However a simpler rout
is to use Lemma 3.2 for the case of disjunctive attacks involving only two
elements. All we need to do is to convert a disjunctive attack on n ≥ 3
elements, as in Figure 53 to a disjunctive attack on n − 1 elements as in
Figure 54. We use auxiliary points as indicated.
We can therefore assume that we are dealing only with disjunctive attacks
on two points, since all other disjunctive attacks can be reduced to two points
by repeated applications of the above procedure.
The case of disjunctive attacks of two points was dealt with by Figure
50 and Lemma 3.2.
Definition 3.6 (Eliminating joint attacks). Let P = (S, S0R) be a joint
attack network. Deﬁne an ordinary network P∗ = (S∗, R∗), with S ⊆ S∗
and S∗, R∗ as follows. We add to S the following additional groups of points.
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Group G1
For every s ∈ S a new node s¯
Group G2
For every X ⊆ S,X ﬁnite with two points or more add the node e(X).
Let S∗ = S ∪G1 ∪G2.
Deﬁne R∗ on S∗ as follows.
Assume {a1, . . . , an}Rbj hold for n ≥ 2, j = 1, . . . , k, where b1, . . . , bk are
all the nodes jointly attacked by {a1, . . . , an}. Figure 55 shows the situation.
Note that we cannot represent this situation by writing Figure 56 because
that would be a disjunctive attack.
We deﬁne R∗ according to Figure 57. Thus Figure 55 with R becomes
Figure 57 with R∗.
We have that the following hold in R∗:
1. sR∗s¯ for any s ∈ S.
2. tR∗s whenever {t}Rs
3. If {a1, . . . , an}Rbj, holds with n ≥ 2, and j = 1, . . . ,m then let a¯iR∗e
(a1, . . . , an) hold for i = 1, . . . , n and let e(a1, . . . , an)R
∗bj hold, for
j = 1, . . . ,m.
Lemma 3.7. Let P and P∗ be as in Deﬁnition 3.6. Observe the following
1. Since s is the only attacker of s¯, we have for any Caminada labelling that
λ(s) = 1 iﬀ λ(s¯) = 0
λ(x) =? iﬀ λ(s¯) =?
2. In Figure 57
λ(e(a1, . . . , an)) = 1 iﬀ
λ(a1) = λ(a2) = . . . = λ(an) = 1
3. If λ(ai) = 1 for i = 1, . . . , n, then λ(bj) = 0, j = 1, . . . ,m.
4. If for some i, λ(ai) = 0 then λ(e(a1, . . . , an)) = 0 and then there is no
attack from e(a1, . . . , am) on any bj, j = 1, . . . ,m.
5. Any Caminada–Gabbay labelling function on λ∗ on S∗ induces a labelling
λ = λ∗  S on S.
To explain the relationship between P and P∗ we need some general
concepts.
Definition 3.8. Let P = (S,R) be ordinary Dung argumentation networks.
Let E ⊆ S be a set of nodes. We say that E is a critical set in P iﬀ the
following holds:
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X
e
e¯
b1 bn−1 bn. . .
Figure 54.
an
. . .
b1 bm
{a1, . . . , an}Rb1, . . . , {a1, . . . , an}Rbm
a1 , . . . ,
Figure 55.
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, . . . ,
a1 , . . . , an
b1 bn
{a1, . . . , an}R{b1, . . . , bm}
Figure 56.
an
b1 . . . bm
e(a1, . . . , an)
a¯1 a¯n
a1 . . .
Figure 57.
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(*) For any two Caminada labelling λ1 and λ2 on P, if λ1 and λ2 agree on
E then λ1 = λ2
Lemma 3.9. In Deﬁnition 3.6, S is critical in (S∗, R∗).
Proof. Follows from Lemma 3.7.
Remark 3.10 (Labelling of higher order networks). To show the existence
of labelling for higher order networks P = (S, S0, R), we reduce the network
to an ordinary network P∗ = (S∗, R∗) by eliminating ﬁrst the disjunctive
attacks and then the joint attacks.
From our sequence of Lemmas we know that S ⊆ S∗ is critical in P ∗.
Therefore any labelling λ∗ on S∗ induces a labelling λ = λ∗  S on S which
is acceptable in P. Furthermore, λ∗ can be uniquely retrieved from λ and
thus any λ on S can be expanded to a unique λ∗ on S∗.
•
e d
f
c
ba
Figure 58.
Example 3.11. Figure 58 displays the following network from [19].
S = {a, b, c, d, e, f}
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R is deﬁned as follows
{a, c, d}Rb
{ab}Rc
{b}Rd
{c, e}Rd
{d}Re
{b, f}Re
{a}Rf
{d}Rf
The grounded extension is {a}. The preferred extensions are {a, b, e} and
{a, c, d}.
We now construct our reduct ordinary network. We add points a¯, b¯, c¯, d¯,
e¯, f¯ and e(a, b, d), e(a, b), e(c, e) and e(b, f) and get Figure 59.
b
a¯a
e(a, c, d)
e(a, b)
f f¯
e(b, f)
c c¯
e e¯
d d¯
e(a, c)
b¯
Figure 59.
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We have the following attacks:
a→ a¯
b→ b¯
c→ c¯
d → d¯
e→ e¯
f → f¯
a¯→ e(a, c, d)
c¯→ e(a, c, d)
d¯ → e(a, c, d)
e(a, c, d) → b
a¯→ e(a, b)
b¯→ e(a, b)
e(a, b) → c
b→ d
c¯→ e(c, e)
e¯→ e(c, e)
e(c, e) → d
d→ e
b¯→ e(b, f)
f¯ → e(b, f)
e(b, f)→ e
a→ f
d→ f
Graphically it is very easy to convert any joint network to an ordinary
network as follows.
1. First replace any node x by x→ x¯ and let any arrows emanating from x
to emanate now from x¯. Any arrows targeting x remain as is.
2. Any joint attack from a1, . . . , an on b have arrows emanating from each
ai (now emanating from a¯i) to an unnamed junction where they all meet
and then a single arrow go to b as in Figure 60.
Name the junction e(a1, . . . , an) and let the arrows be now attacking
arrows of an ordinary network. We get Figure 61.
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unnamed junction
a1 . . . an
b
Figure 60.
an
e(a1, . . . , an)
b b¯
a¯1a1 a¯n, . . . ,
Figure 61.
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4. Comparison and discussion
4.1. Comparison with Nielsen and Parsons
We compare this work with the paper of Nielsen and Parsons [20, 19]. Nielsen
and Parsons put forward a system where joint attacks are possible. They
introduce attacks of the form XRy where X is a non-empty set of arguments
and y is an argument.
The attack XRY , where Y is a set of arguments is reduced to
XRY iﬀ XRy for some y ∈ Y.
This is the same as our approach for the case in which the networks we
are dealing with have no arrows in them and in which there are no disjunctive
attacks. The point of view of Nielsen and Parsons arises from a qualitative
argument in favour of joint attacks. They argue their case convincingly and
proceed to develop the theory beautifully in their ﬁrst paper [20]. In the
second paper [19] they continue with an algorithm for computing extensions.
We arrived at these attacks from a diﬀerent point of view. We are sub-
stituting one network in another. We thus get a network attacking another
network. Since the networks may have points in common they can internally
inﬂuence one another.
To obtain the Nielsen and Parsons case our networks should have no
internal arrows, and no disjunctive attacks. So we interpret an attack on
a network as in Figure 46 reading (r2). Another diﬀerence between the
two approaches is the reduction we make of the joint attack networks to
ordinary Dung networks. The original network becomes a critical subset in
an ordinary Dung network and so we can compute the extensions of our
original network by computing the extensions of the target network.
We would like to quote and criticise a statement of Nielsen–Parsons in
their paper [20] they say:
We claim that it is never necessary to specify a non-singleton set of
arguments as attacked, as in {A1, . . . , An}{B1, . . . , Bm}: If collective
defeat is taken to heart, the attack can be reformulates as a series of
attacks
{A1, . . . , An}  B1
...
{A1, . . . , An}  Bm
It is easily seen that the above attacks would imply the attack, which is
intended, as the validity of the A-arguments would ensure that none of
the B-arguments are valid.
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If instead indeterministic defeat is required, the attack can be reformu-
lated as
{A1, . . . , Bn, B2, . . . , Bm, }  B1,
which ensures that in case the A arguments are valid, then B1 cannot
be a valid argument if the remaining B-arguments are also true, thus
preventing the entire set of B-arguments from being valid at once, if the
A-arguments are true.
Nielsen and Parsons use reading (r3) of Figure 46 (to use our terminolo-
gy), namely they use Figure 48. Their notion of ‘collective defeat’ requires
reading (r2) and not (r3) as Nielsen and Parsons claim.
4.2. Connection with attacks on attacks
In our paper [1] we introduced the notion of attack on attack. Figure 62 is
an example.
d
c
ba
Figure 62.
The network contains the arguments {a, b, c, d}. a attacks b. Denote this
attack by ‘a → b’. The attack ‘a → b’ is being attacked by c and it itself
attacks the node d.
Our uestion is how does this relate to our joint and disjunctive attack
networks?
Consider Figures 63 and 64.
Can we view Figure 62 as the result of substituting Figure 64 for x in
Figure 63? The answer is that if we do that we get the wrong meaning.
The subject is studied extensively in [1] and [13]. The actual meaning of
Figure 62 is that c attacks the argument (denoted by ‘a → b’) motivating
and describing why a attacks b, and this very argument actually attacks d.
So the correct interpretation of Figure 64 is Figure 65.
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d
x
c
Figure 63.
a −→ b
Figure 64.
a and ‘a → b’ mount6 a joint attack on b. So Figure 62 can be presented
as Figure 66.
Of course if we want to be very pedantic we can say that c, which attacks
the ‘a → b’ component of this joint attack, is attacking ‘a → b’ jointly with
‘(c→(‘a → b’))’ argument. Also ‘a → b’ which is attacking d is attacking it
jointly with “((‘a → b’)→ d)’ argument. So the correct ﬁgure corresponding
to Figure 62 is Figure 67.
However, since the attacks of c on ‘a → b’ and of ‘a → b’ on d are not
themselves being attacked, we do not need to unfold them in Figure 67 and
Figure 66 is suﬃcient.
a
b
‘a→ b’
Figure 65.
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a
b
‘a→ b’
c
d
Figure 66.
Note that if we systematically rewrite attacks on attacks on attacks, etc.,
as joint attacks and then use the semantics of Section 3 to deﬁne extensions,
we end up with semantics for all these higher level attacks. This is done
directly in [13].
4.3. Flow argumentation networks
This subsection deals with Figure 41. To explain Figure 41, we need a
consistent point of view to explain the case of disjunctive attacks as in Figure
46. For Figure 46 we know that we require that
(*) x = in implies a = out or c = out
The questions relevant to our understanding of Figure 41 are the following
Question 1
Does x attack each of a and c and expects at least one of them to succeed
(reading (r2) of Figure 41 in Section 3.1) or does x attack only the set {a, c}
and expects (*) above to hold? (Reading (r1) of Figure 41 in Section 3.1).
Obviously to be able to give Figure 41 any meaning we must adopt the
view that x attacks each of a and c (reading (r2)).
We now ask our second question.
Question 2
When the attack of x on one of {a, c} succeeds, e.g. a = out, is x still
attacking c? In other words x is still attacking even though x does not care
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b
‘(‘(a → b)’→ d)’
d
‘(c→‘(a → b)’)’c
‘a→ b’
a
Figure 67.
if the attack succeeds? If the answer is no, and there is no attack on c, then
this means that in Figure 41, the labelling
1. x = in, b = in, a = out, c = in
is acceptable, because the success of the attack on a (a = out) entails that
there is no attack from x onto c and hence the joint attack with b on c fails
because x is not attacking and hence c = in.2 If the answer is yes, and
indeed there is a attack on c then (1) is not acceptable and (2) is acceptable.
2. x = in, b = in, a = out and c = out
Of course, both views will accept (3) below.
3. x = in, b = in, a = in and c = out
We adopt the view that x sends attacks in the direction of a and c and
expects at least one of them to succeed (this is the (r2) reading of Figure 46
in Section 3.1).3
2In this case, a = out makes x attack (with b) on c a voluntary attack. We investigate
voluntary attacks in [4].
3Imagine mother wants to buy a special toy for her little girl for Christmas. There is
great deamnd for the toy which is very popular and people queue up early in the morning
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Notice the words we use. We talk about ‘x sending attacks in the direc-
tion of y’. We speak of ‘joint attacks’ and ‘disjunctive attacks’. We need
for formalise our intuitive model. We found that the best way to represent
what is going on is in terms of ‘ﬂow’, the attacks ﬂow along the edges of the
network. So we call these ‘ﬂow argumentation networks’.
It would help if we consider an example. Consider Figure 68, which is
an expansion of Figure 41, with a new twist to it. The arguments of Figure
68 are {x, a, b, c, d, e} and we also gave names to the ﬂow (ﬂow of attacks)
junctions {α, β, γ, δ}. These are not arguments, just input output nodes in
the graph, to help us follow the attacks ﬂows.
δ
d x b
cae
α γ
β
Figure 68.
In Figure 68, d sends a disjunctive attack through junction α. The attack
splits into an attack on e and an attack in the direction of a and c. x at the
same time sends a disjunctive attack through junction γ which splits one in
the direction of a and one in the direction of c. The x attack going to c joins
forces with the attack on c emanating from b. At junction δ they join and
become a joint attack on c.
The attack of x in the direction of a meets the attack of d in the direction
of a and c at junction β and decide to mount a joint attack emanating from
β on a and c. The ﬂow from γ to δ is an attack of x intended for a,
at toy shops to make sure that they can get the product. So mother sends her husband
and her brother to two diﬀerent shops to queue up early in the morning in the hope that
at least one of them will get to buy the toy before stocks run out for the day. Mother
would be happy if at least one of them succeeds. Under this view each one of the two men
is there buying a toy.
The other option is for mother to ask them to call the other mobile phone the minute
one of them secures the toy. In that case the other may not buy the toy. This is the
other option.
294 D. M. Gabbay
at β it joined the ﬂow d → α → β and became a joint attack from β on
a and on c. We can say x did not mind forming this coalition with d and
adding c to the attack because x is attacking c anyway through the direction
x→ γ → δ → c.
The above description is in literary prose, giving intentions to the arrows
in terms of ﬂows. How do we do this formally? And how do we calculate
labelling?
Suppose we label c = out, a = in, e = in. Is this OK with d = x = b =
in? Or maybe we need also e = out not e = in?
We need a formal model which follows the ﬂow using α, β, γ, δ.
We leave this as the subject of another paper.
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